General Gray Sees the Need


Lt. General Al Gray, Commanding General of FMFLant and future Commandant of the Marine Corps, and LtCol Bill Keller, Commanding Officer of 2d Radio Battalion, FMFLant, met at MCAS Cherry Point in the spring of 1984 to welcome home the returning members of the 2d Radio Battalion Detachment to Beirut, Lebanon. It had not been a routine deployment, though. The Marines of 2d RadBn had conducted tactical cryptologic operations in support of the entire deployment of the US peacekeeping force in Beirut since the initial landings at Beirut International Airport.


They had seen combat; they saw the barracks of the Battalion Landing Team destroyed by a terrorist's truck bomb, and they had provide critical intelligence support to US forces. Now it was over. Now it was time to assess what was done right, what was done wrong, and how to make it better.
During the wait, Gray and Keller were discussing the various problems faced by the Radio Battalion detachment. Both agreed that the most significant problem was the lack of a tactical cryptologic database available from national and theater assets prior to the Marine's landing in Beirut. Equally as significant was the "unconventional" aspects of the communications networks used by the various factions in Beirut. Those that posed the greatest threat to the Marines did not abide by standard military communications procedures, nor did they follow set frequencies or callsigns


Since the detachment had received nothing from NSA, they were forced to begin initial signal search and development operations. In other words, start from zero. LtGen. Gray wanted to try something new. His vision was to create a hybrid capability for advance force operations by integrating a Force Reconnaissance Team with attached Radio Battalion cryptologists, selected and trained for ground reconnaissance and special operations. He directed LtCol. Keller to coordinate with 2d Force Reconnaissance Company to test this idea.


The Idea Faces Opposition


LtCol. Keller was not a big fan of General Gray's idea, but the boss had spoken. LtCol. Keller went back to the Battalion and told his S-3 Operations Officer, Maj. Bill Robinson, to do something to make General Gray happy. Maj. Robinson called the Commanding Officer of 2d Force Reconnaissance Company, Maj. Joe Crockett, and explained the situation. Maj. Crockett wasn't especially keen on the idea either. He had previously provided security support for the 2d Radio Bn detachment on Tiger Island, Honduras, and his reconnaissance Marines weren't overly impressed with the "wirehead jellybellys" of the Radio Battalion. However, Maj. Crockett believed that if General Gray thought it was a good idea, it was worth a serious effort.


Their initial quick fix was to attach a Radio Battalion Marine, equipped with an AN/GRR-8 receiver to a Force Recon Team during an exercise and see if he could keep up and do something worthwhile. He would search for and identify opposing force communications. The Radio Battalion, not wanting to risk embarrassment, wanted to select a Marine with a high PFT score, some grit, and a talent for field work. Cpl. Kyle O'Malley was their choice. He was mentally and physically tough and possessed a high degree of tactical and technical proficiency.


O'Malley was directed to report to 2d Force Reconnaissance Company the day before the exercise began, with no warning order or any guidance that made sense. The Force Recon Team was not amused. O'Malley tried to make the best of the situation and told the Team Leader that he would do his best to not become a burden to the team. The Force Recon Team, with O'Malley in tow, was "administratively" inserted into the objective area on D minus 5 for advance force operations. It did not go well. The Recon Team tolerated O'Malley during the exercise but later complained to Maj. Crockett that O'Malley caused excessive noise when setting up and tearing down his equipment and that the team's communications net was used excessively by him. Back at RadBn, O'Malley indicated that he was truly and "outsider" on the team and was physically drained after conducting signal search operations for 72 hours straight with no sleep. This was a dumb idea.


There was little enthusiasm to continue the concept after O'Malley's experience so the concept was tabled, and no further action or efforts were made until LtCol. Chuck Gallina became CO of 2d Radio Bn in the summer of 1984. LtGen. Gray discussed the idea with Gallina who subsequently became the primary driving proponent of the concept.


The Concept is Reborn


In August 1984, Gallina called Capt. E.L. Gillespie, J2 SIGINT Operations Officer, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and informed him that he would be receiving orders to report to 2d Radio Battalion no later than January 1985. Gallina told Gillespie that he was being assigned as the "Special Operations Officer" fo the Battalion and that he was to develop a concept of operations to integrate Radio Battalion Marines with Force Reconnaissance Teams for independent advance force operations.
Capt. Gillespie arrived on 15 December 1984 and was assigned to the Battalion S-3 Shop under Maj. Bob Carrick, the new Operations officer. Maj. Carrick made it perfectly clear that he did not support this new concept, did not have much regard for "SPECOPS" types, and that this whole effort was a waste of time. However, the CO wanted it done, so he was obligated to see it through. Capt. Gillespie submitted a draft "Talking Paper" with the following results:

  • Integration with a 4-man Force Recon Team was not viable due to conflicting missions
  • A separate 6-man Radio Bn team trained in selected airborne and seaborne insertion/extraction techniques, ground reconnaissance and survival skills was required
  • The team must be trained and equipped for both independent employment or employment in conjunction with Force Recon Teams or other JSOC forces
  • Separate long and short range communication paths were required
  • Additional SIGINT/EW equipment was required

The original mission statement for the team was:
"To conduct limited communications intelligence and specified electronic warfare operations in support of Force Reconnaissance operations during advance force or special operations missions."

Capt. Gillespie was directed to be prepared within a week to provide a briefing of the concept and requirements to LtGen Gray and to the Division, Wing, and FSSG Commanding Generals. LtCol. Gallina also requested that Capt. Gillespie develop a list of potential titles for the concept. The initial list of titles submitted was:

  • Force Reconnaissance Support Team (FRST)
  • Radio Search Team (RST)
  • Signal Search Team (SST)
  • Special Search Team (SST)
  • Radio Research Team (RRT)
  • Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT)

LtGen. Gray got the list and personally circled the Radio Reconnaissance Team as the official name for the teams. LtGen Gray then directed that:
The CO of 2d Radio Battalion screen, select, and train the required personnel to deploy two 6-man RRT's for a proof of concept operational deployment during the advance force operational phase of Exercise Solid Shield-85. The CO of 2d Force Reconnaissance Company will assist in the personnel selection, training and equipping as outlined in the concept briefing provided by Capt. Gillespie. II MEF will ensure that all appropriate Solid Shield-85 OPLANS, OPORDERS, and Annexes adequately reflect the integration of the RRT capability.


Proof of Concept Preparation


Capt. Gillespie was directed to immediately commence screening of 2d Radio Battalion personnel and was assured by the Company Commanders that ANY MARINE in the Battalion that was identified as a candidate would be made available. Unfortunately, this was not the case. A letter was drafted by Capt. Gillespie and signed "by Direction" by Maj. Carrick directing that the Company Commanders provide a list of candidates for the RRT concept. No names were initially received. LtCol. Gallina heard this and went ballistic. He then conducted a personal meeting with the Company Commanders and Maj. Carrick. Nevertheless, the screening and selection of the initial 12 RRT Marines was not an easy task to accomplish.


Most Radio Battalion Marines did not share the bosses' enthusiasm for the vision. Also, there was a resistance by Company Commanders to allow the best Marines to be assigned to the task. By and large, (with the exception of the SNCO's and Sgts.) the majority of the Marines provided to form the initial RRT's were a group of "malcontents" that were just marking time and waiting for their EAS. However, in hind sight, these were the right Marines at the right time to acheive the RRT capability. As one of the candidates put it, "There is nothing that the Marine Corps can do to me that I can't take." The original "Dirty Dozen" RRT members were:

Capt. Ernie L. Gillespie (OIC)
RRT #1 (Arabic)
SSgt. McBride (NCOIC)
Sgt Maida
Cpl Herron
Cpl Greve
LCpl Tollerton
LCpl Joiner


RRT #2 (Spanish)
SSgt Chadwick
Sgt Parrish
Cpl O'Malley
Cpl Jemente
LCpl Levin


The Training Begins...


At this time, Major Carrick directed that all of the RRT candidates must go through the 2d Force Reconnaissance Company Indocrination Process. Capt. Gillespie did not agree with this requirement and strongly objected. Major Carrick took it to the CO who agreed. Major Carrick later admitted that the only reason that he insisted on this issue was that he felt that all or most of the Radio Battalion Marines would either quit or fail the Indoc and this nonsense would be put to rest once and for all.
The decision was made that the RRT candidates would endure a tailored three week "Reconnaissance Indoctrination Program" (RIP) course prior to the actual Indoc Test. GySgt Alonso, Training NCO, 2d Force Recon was the SNCO assigned to the task. Capt. Gillespie assembled the RRT candidates, introduced GySgt Alonso, and provided an overall briefing on what had to be done. GySgt Alonso then took charge of the candidates and commenced training.
The training and indoctrination was intense and grueling, yet not one of the original Marines quit -- ever. In fact, GySgt Alonso gained a great respect for the "never quit" attitude of these Marines.


Finally, the day of the Indoc arrived and 2d Force Recon came with a "crew" of Marines that had the sole purpose of making the candidate Marines quit. Along with the RRT candidates, several other Marines who wanted to try out for Force Recon arrived. The Indoc started at 0400 with the 17 Marines lined up in the hallway at attention and the Corpsman taking vital signs. Each Marine was then brought into a room for an intense grilling on why he wanted to be a Recon Marine. All personnel were taken outside and a PFT was conducted. Maximum effort was expected and any Marine perceived to be holding back or "sandbagging" would be dropped. The lowest score from the RRT Marines was a 285.


As soon as a Marine crossed the finish line, he was met by the Indoc instructors who immediately ordered the Marine to start flutter kicks until the last man came in. When the last man arrived, all personnel donned a flak jacket and grabbed a rubber rifle, and the eight mile endurance run started at a fast pace with rifles at a high port. During this run, the Indoc instructors took every opportunity to grab a rifle or othewise instigate a Marine to quit. There were many times where the formation would stop and flutter kicks would begin. The formation would run through ponds or stagnant water, stop to do mountain climbers and then roll around in the sand to make "sugar cookies". They did Ranger pushups and fireman's carry races up OP5, in a game called "It Pays to be a Winner."


Anything and everything was used to make this an absolutely miserable experience and cause the Marines to quit. Some did quit, but the RRT Marines kept going. They carried logs, sandbags, and did duckwalks. When the run was completed, there were 13 Marines left. The next event was the timed double run of the Obstacle Course then on to the pool. The Marines had to conduct the following pool events:

  • 25 meter underwater swim, only breaking the surface twice
  • Swim 100 meters using side, back and breast strokes
  • Don utilities with boots and jump into the pool form a 10 ft height and tread water for 10 minutes
  • Inflate their utility trousers, float for 5 minutes, then exit the water
  • Remove utility blouse, re-enter the water and tread water for 1 minute with hands out of the water
  • Conduct a 200 meter swim using any stroke


After the pool was over, GySgt Alonso put the remaining Marines in formation and led the run back to the Radio Battalion area. He announced that they had all passed and they were the best group that had ever gone through the Indoc. All of the RRT candidates and one other Marine from 6th Marines had passed. Capt. Gillespie later talked to the indoc instructors who indicated that they had done everything that they could think of to make the RRT Marines quit -- but they wouldn't. A big step had been taken. After the Indoc, one RRT were sent to Airborne training at Ft. Benning, Ga, while the other Marines prepared and trained for Solid Shield-85.


The RRT's Earn Their Pay


At approximately 2245, 3 May 1985 (D minus 5), RRT #1 with SSgt McBride as Team Leader conducted a tactical, blacked-out rappel operation from a CH-46 into the Verona Loop area of Camp Lejeune. Upon a successful rappel, RRT #1 patrolled to a predesignated location, established a concealed harborsite, and commenced operations.
At approximately 2305 on that same night, RRT #2 with SSgt Chadwick as Team Leader (and Capt. Gillespie augmenting the team) conducted a blacked-out, tactical combat-equipment, static-line parachute operation (800ft) from a CH-46 into Drop Zone Penguin. Upon landing, the chutes were rolled and cached for later pickup and each member converged at the predesignated rally point. At the rally point, the SATCOM radio antenna was setup and the execution codeword, "Cadillac" -- indicating a successful jump -- was transmitted to the USS J. Daniels (Advance Force Flagship) Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC). Communications were perfect.

RRT#1 conducted an uneventful patrol to the predesignated harborsite. RRT #2, however, faced a much different situation. II MEF intelligence had failed to alert them of an OPFOR Command Post located near the DZ. Cpl O'Malley was on point, and by using NVG's and stealth, he led RRT #2 through the CP without being detected. It took approximately 2 hourse to move through the CP -- roughly 100 meters. RRT #2 made it to the pre-designated harborsite just before dawn.

 Both RRT's were highly successful in the signal search and development operations, and over 90 tactical and technical reports were issued, transmitted to the SARC, and passed to the Amphibious Task Force. SATCOM, HF, and VHF communications were maintained with the RRT's being the only advance force assets able to communicate directly to the SARC. All Force Recon and SEAL team reports were relayed by the RRT's. The RRT's also directed the emplacement of 10 HEXJAMS by the Force Recon Teams that totally disrupted OPFOR communications during H-Hour.

On D-Day, RRT #1 was picked up by a CH-46 via Special Purpose Insertion and Extraction rig (SPIE). RRT #2 remained in place and linked up with friendly forces coming ashore. LtGen Gray and LtCol Gallina were very pleased. The RRT's had provide the bulk of the intelligence reports (75 TACREPS), had not been compromised, and was the critical communications link to the Amphibious Task Force. By all accounts, the Radio Reconnaissance Proof of Concept was an unqualified success. Even the naysayers were changing their tune.


Radio Reconnaissance Deploys


Between 1986 and 1989, RRT's were deployed as an element of the MEU(SOC) Radio Battalion Detachment assigned to each of the rotating 11th, 13th, 15th, 22nd, 24th, and 26th MEU(SOC) deployments. Each of the assigned RRT's contributed to the overall mission of the Radio Battalion detachment and the MEU (SOC), and their reputation was growing. Capt. Gillespie was assigned as the OIC of the 2d RadBn Detachment, 24th MEU (SOC) in 1986, which was the first RadBn detachment to conduct real world operations during Operation Earnest Will (Kuwaiti Oil Tanker escort operation).

The 24th MEU (SOC) RRT was involved in significant cryptologic operations in the Persian Gulf and provided critical intelligence support for several combat actions against Iranian forces, including the seizure of the Iranian mine-laying vessel, IRAN AJR and the incident at Middle Shoals Light. Other RRT personnel were involved in actions in Panama leading p to and during Operation Just Cause (invasion of Panama). During Operation Just Cause, SSgt Greg Lungstrum and Sgt Lou Kelley were assigned in direct support of the SEAL Task Force at Padilla airfield.

 The ball was rolling now, and Radio Reconnaissance was here to stay. In many cases, MEU Commanders would state that the RRT's were the most valuable intelligence and communications asset in the force -- and that if only six Marines could be inserted during advance force, pre-assault, or special operations mission -- the RRT would be the ones to go.